The Record and Improvability of Economic Forecasting by Victor Zarnowitz
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE RECORD AND IMPROVABILITY
OF ECONOMIC FORECASTING
Victor Zarnowitz
Working Paper No. 2099




The research reported here is part of the NBERTs research program
in Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the
author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2099
December 1986
The Record and Improvability of Economic Forecasting
ABSTRACT
Have macroeconomic forecasts grown more or less accurate over time? This
paper assembles, examines, and interprets evidence bearing on this question.
Contrary to some critics, there are no indications that U.S. forecasts have
grown systematically worse, that is, less accurate, more biased, or both.
Neither do any definite trends in a positive direction emerge from comparisons
of annual and quarterly multiperiod forecasts and time-series projections for
the principal aggregative variables.
The argument is developed and to some extent documented that major
failures of forecasting are related to the incidence of slowdowns and
contractions in general economic activity. Not only the forecasts of real GNP
growth and unemployment but also those of nominal GNP growth and inflation
often go seriously wrong when such setbacks occur. Forecasters tend to rely
heavily on the persistence of trends in spending, output, and the price
level. More attention to data and techniques that are sensitive to business
cycle movements and turning points could help improve their record.
Victor Zarnowitz
Graduate School of Business
University of' Chicago
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637I. Questions and Problems
The question "Is Better Forecasting Possible?", would seem to be of
critical importance to both makers and users of macroeconomic predictions.
Indeed, the ability to produce accurate predictions of the course of' the
economy in the near-term future is probably the main criterion by which the
public judges the usefulness of our entire profession. It is true that this
popular standard fails to discriminate between wrong specifications of
econonomic models and wrong choices of assumptions about outside events,
whereas one may argue that an economist should be held mainly responsible for
the former rather than the latter source of forecast errors. But most
economists would agree that the proper test of the practical aspects of their
expertise consists in how well they can predict or "explain" postsample data.
Critics often assert that the economic forecasts generally are poor.
However, it is not clear what standards they apply and whether such complaints
represent more than casual opinions. Large errors can occur for a variety of
reasons and need not be either systematic or symptomatic of forecasters'
inability.
Logically, the inquiry into the improvability of forecasting should start
with some prior questions: How accurate have the forecasts been on the average
in the past? What are the sources and characteristics of superior forecasts?
For several reasons, however, these seemingly simple questions lack unique and
conclusive answers.
1.The forecasts must be explicit, verifiable, and sufficient to permit a
responsible appraisal. But the recorded history of' macroeconomic forecasting
is of recent origin. Time series on specific, quantitative, and comparable
predictions are as a rule short. Few forecasters have been active consistently
over many years; many offer only small samples of observations with isolated2
hits or misses that could be largely due to chance.
2. Some periods are easier to forecast than others. For example, once it is
clear that a recession has just ended, it is a rather safe bet that the re-
covery will continue in the months immediately ahead, but just when a mature
expansion will end is usually quite difficult to anticipate.
3. Somevariables are easier to forecast than others.In general, the trend-
dominated and smooth series are better predicted than the cyclical and volatile
series. Forecasting models differ greatly in size and complexity --thenumber
and composition of enodgenous and exogenous variables. It is difficult to make
dependable comparisons across such models.
4. Economic agents generally use the forecasts to help formulate and improve
their plans and decisions. They expect that the value of the resulting
reductions in their errors will tend to exceed the effective costs to them of
producing or acquiring the forecasts. However, these costs and returns are
typically difficult to estimate and unknown to an outside analyst. Users have
different needs, skills, and preferences ("loss functions"). The size of
forecasting errors may not be sufficient to determine their consequences for
the decisions based on the forecasts.
5. Different summary measures of error may lead to different appraisals of a
given set of forecasts. The results will depend on whether the averages are
based on absolute or squared errors; on whether the errors are computed for
predictions of levels or changes; on the importance of measurement errors and
the treatment of data revisions. Absolute accuracy measures, which show
deviations from the obviously unattainable state of perfection (zero errors),
need to be complemented with relative accuracy measures, which compare
forecasts from different sources or of different types. Here the standard is
often some objective "benchmark" model, e.g., low-cost extrapolations of the3
own history of the target series. The optimal standards vary with the
properties of the time series in question.
6.Ideally,forecasts should be unbiased, i.e., have random, non—autocor-
related errors averaging zero, since forecasters should use the available
information to eliminate all avoidable systematic errors. But success in this
endeavor requires sufficiently large samples of comparable predictions on
series generated by sufficiently stable processes. If these conditions are not
met, the apparent bias may be spurious. A different reason for the same result
may lie in asymmetric loss f'unctions.
7. Macroeconomic forecasts vary greatly with respect to the relative roles of
model and judgment, but in practice inevitably include elements of both. There
is no way to avoid judgment in the choice of the model itself and on how the
modeled regularities of the sample period are to be modified in light of new
and external events. Uses of objective, reproducible methods offer valuable
opportunities for learning, the results of which can be recorded and
published. This advantage is not provided by those forecasters who do not
disclose their assumptions and techniques or models. Experienced judgment may
be the most valuable property of a forecaster but it is not something that can
be readily transmitted to others.
In sum, the quality of forecasts is a relative and multidimensional
concept. Forecasts vary in many ways: by source, techniques, variables and
periods covered, timing and horizon. It is generally difficult to allow for
these differences so as to make meaningful comparisons across forecasters and
over time, even after the event, with data on the corresponding actual values
on hand.
The history of modern forecasting overlaps the "information revolution" of
the last thirty years, a period of rapid expansion in the scope and content ofeconomic data, measures, and literature. The process was (and is) the result
of a number of interacting developments on both the demand side and the supply
side: advances in data collection and processing, in economic theory,
statistics, and econometrics; the accelerating power of the computer; the
spread of modern management techniques propelled by competition; the growing
size and planning requirements of governments. As usual in times of
revolutionary change great expectations were born. Some of these promised too
much. This certainly applies to the notion of a road to dependable business
and economic policies built by a new science of optimum forecasting.
II. Some Evidence and Interpretations
Is there a way to address what appears to be a complex question of trends
in forecasting accuracy without getting bogged down in the many differences
among forecasters, techniques, models, variables, horizons, and periods
covered?I hope to show that the answer is a qualified yes. The problems
discussed above will not be resolved but the complications they pose can be
reduced by the design of the study, and some limited but pertinent results can
be obtained from the available record.
Annual Forecasts: Comparisons Across Time and Sources
Table 1 arrays, by common coverage in time, measures of average error
without regard to sign for a large collection of annual ex ante forecasts of
nominal and real growth and inflation. These are the longest authenticated
time series of this kind that could be collected, but they reach back only to
1953 (for GNP) and 1959 (real GNP and the implicit price deflator).1 There are
gaps and overlaps in this compilation that one would wish away, but they
1See notes to Table 1 for sources of the forecasts covered and references
to related studies.5
reflect the availability of the data and could not be avoided. The forecasts
are roughly comparable in timing, most having been made in October or November
of year t for the year t+1, i.e., before the publication of the first official
GMP estimates for the last quarter of year t.
Table 1 has a highly diversified coverage. It includes averages from
regular surveys of professional forecasters (columns 3, 5, and 7), various
predictions selected for early and consistent coverage (column 4), forecasts by
the successive teams of President's economic advisers (column 6), and by two
econometric service bureaus (columns 8 and 9). Individual and collective
judgments, informal and formal approaches, small and large models --allof
these are well represented. Each line refers to a period that covers a variety
of business conditions.
The mean absolute error (MAE) measures assembled in Table 1 display no
systematic upward or downward trends, as can be seen by comparing the entries
within each of the columns 3-9 for the individual forecast sets. The overall
means in column 10 convey the same message. True, errors in the annual
predictions of nominal GNP growth rates were on the average larger in the last
eight complete years than in the eight previous years, for example, but the
opposite applies to the predictions of real GNP growth and inflation.
To allow for any changes in the means of the predicted series across the
periods covered, benchmark MAE measures were computed for selected naive
models: 1k—year moving average extrapolations for the annual percentage changes
in GNP and RGNP, last—year extrapolations for those in IPD.2 Comparisons of
the forecast errors (columns 3-10) with the naive extrapolation (XP) errors
2These simple models perform relatively well for the respective
variables, and more elaborate time series models are neither needed nor
properly applicable here. Annual data comparable to those available to the
forecasters are short; also, see Table 1, note i.6
(column 11) show that the former are in all but one case (line 10)
substantially smaller than the latter. Moreover, the relative errors, that is,
ratios of MAE for the forecasts to the corresponding MAE-XP measures (see
column 12), show a tendency to decline between the earlier and the more recent
periods. On this criterion, then, one would conclude that the annual forecasts
of nominal and real GNP growth may have actually improved, at least since the
late 1950's. (For inflation, the evidence is weaker, as shown in lines 10—13.)
It is also interesting to note that, consistent with several studies such
as McNees (1975, 1976) and Zarnowitz (1967, 1972, 1979), it is difficult to
detect systematic differences in accuracy among the well-known professional
forecasters. In general, the MAE statistics for the forecast sets included in
Table 1 do not differ much. This is well illustrated by the following
tabulation:
Entries in Table 1, columns 3—9, for
GNP RGNP IPD
Mean (x) 1.2 1.1 1.0
Standard deviation (s) 0.4 0.2 0.3
Fraction within around x 15/20 11/12 8/12
The reasons for the similarity of the forecasts, and hence for the
representativeness of the overall averages, are several. Forecasters use to a
large extent the same data, receive the same news, interact, and draw upon a
common pool of knowledge and techniques. The models used often differ
substantially, but their outputs are adjusted to reflect the most recent
changes in the economy, policies, etc., and it is known that these adjustments
reduce the variation among the forecasts (Zarnowitz 1972; Christ 1975).7
Moreover, aggregation over forecasts from business outlook surveys, or
other corresponding and contemporary predictions, works to reduce the effects
of the outliers (Zarnowitz 1984). The aggregate (or average) forecasts are
known to be more accurate over time than most of the individual forecasts from
the given group.
Quarterly Forecasts for the Year Ahead: Cyclical Errors
Table 2 presents mean absolute errors and mean errors calculated over a
set of quarterly one-year-ahead forecasts from five widely used sources. The
period covered, 1971:2-1985:1, is subdivided in three different ways. Of four
equal (14—quarter) subperiods, it is the latest one, 1981:14_1985:14, that shows
the largest MAE. This applies to all four variables included: growth rates in
GNP, RGNP, and IPD, and the unemployment rate UR. But there is no systematic
increase in the errors from one period to the next, except for GNP. The mean
errors vary in sign and size irregularly across the four periods.
Each of the periods listed in section A of the table includes some
especially turbulent times associated with unanticipated turning points in the
level of economic activity and rates of growth in output and prices. But the
last, 1981:4-1985:1, had the largest share of such events: the severe
recession in late 1981 and 1982, the slowdown of' mid-1984, and the surprisingly
strong disinflation. It is presumably this fact that explains why forecasts
for this subperiod were the least accurate.
Indeed, the breakdowns according to cyclical characteristics (sections B
and C) disclose much larger and more systematic differences than the division
of the period into equal parts. For each variable, the MAE are much smaller
for the predictions relating to business expansions including peaks (4)4
quarters) than for the predictions relating to business contractions including
troughs (12 quarters). Also, the absolute values of the ME are in each ease8
much smaller for the first than for the second subset of the forecasts (section
B).
While the dating of business cycles is based on the consensus of the major
turning points in comprehensive economic time series, the dating of growth
cycles is determined in a similar way from the principal turns in the detrended
values of such series. What this means in practice here is that periods during
which the economy's output grew at an average rate exceeding the long—term
trend rate of about 3.3% per year are distinguished from periods during which
it grew more slowly. The high-growth phases include recoveries and booms, the
low—growth phases include slowdowns and recessions. For the so defined growth
cycles (section C), the contrasts between the phase forecast errors are less
sharp than for business cycles but no less regular. The forecasts relating to
the high—growth phases (314 quarters) have smaller MAE than those relating to
the low—growth phases (22 quarters), for each variable. The absolute values of
ME are much smaller for high-growth than low-growth phases in three cases and
equal in one (GNP).
To sumup,forecasts of growth in income and output, of inflation and
unemployment all tend to be both less accurate and more biased for recessions
than for expansions. Similarly, the forecasts for the above-average growth
phases look better than those for the below-average growth phases under both
criteria. These results are consistent with the earlier ones showing that
large errors tend to cluster around business cycle turns, especially peaks
(Zarnowitz 1967, 1979).
The statement just made is not the same as to say that forecasting
failures are due to large unanticipated disturbances. Such shocks can and do
occur under any economic conditions, yet they seem to cause large errors mainly
during slowdowns and contractions. This may be so because it is in these9
phases, rather than in vigorous recoveries and strong widespread expansions,
that the economy is particularly vulnerable. Various stresses and imbalances
accumulate gradually as more and more industries approach high capacity
operations. Costs of labor, capital goods, and credit typically rise; here and
there prices and profits come under squeeze; real shortages appear, growth
weakens, and investment begins to decline. Although these internal
developments, if permitted to take their course, could alone bring about a
downturn, it is also possible for some adverse shocks to speed up this
outcome. Yet the same shocks would probably have been weathered by the economy
in a less exposed state. The forecaster faces an extremely difficult problem
in that (a) it is very difficult to anticipate just when the stresses and
imbalances will do their work and (b) the timing of true random shocks that
matter is always unpredictable, even if their consequences are not.
In addition, predicting a general downturn is always unpopular, and
predicting it prematurely ahead of others may prove quite costly to the
forecaster and his customers. On the other hand, most users are likely to
await eagerly an upturn during a recognized recession, so forecasts of a
recovery will be welcome and often accepted on the basis of early signs of
improvement. In this context, it should be recalled that early cyclical
indicators had in recent times much longer and more variable leads at peaks
than at troughs. (However, their signals of the last recovery came relatively
early in 1982, which probably induced some forecasters to err in predicting
the recovery too soon.) The peak errors show up during the recession and
slowdown periods, the generally smaller trough errors show up during the
recovery and speedup periods.
Finally, there is the hypothesis that important macroeconomic functions
which are approximately linear as long as there is substantial slack in the10
economy and relative price stability, become nonlinear at high levels of
employment and capacity utilization with rising inflation. Econometric models,
it is believed, may not be capable to capture the nonhinearities sufficiently
well, hence would perform worse near the peaks of the cycle than at lower
levels of macroeconomic activity (see, e.g., Evans 197)4, p. 185). This
argument, of course, refers to the endogenous sources of business fluctuations
rather than the effects of exogenous disturbances.
Quarterly Multiperiod Forecasts From Econometric Services, Business Outlook
Surveys, and Time-Series Models
Predicting the developments within the next year or two by quarters is far
more difficult than predicting how the economy will fare from year to year.
Errors of the forecasts for consecutive quarters typically offset each other to
some degree within any year. Also, forecasts for the year ahead can be
satisfactory when based on a good record for the first two quarters, and they
tend to be more accurate than forecasts with effective spans longer than two
quarters (Zarnowitz 1979).
However, there is much demand for frequent and detailed predictions, and
forecasters have responded by producing quarterly or even monthly forecasts for
sequences of k-8 quarters ahead. The ambitious tendency to disaggregate
forecasts over time as well as over space received much support from the
falling computation costs in the 1960s and 1970s. With few exceptions, the
macroeconometric models now regularly used in commercial forecasting are large,
in several well—known cases very large.
The great expansion of the models led to expectations of dependably good
forecasts, which however met with frequent disappointments. Soon the
theoretical basis of the conventional macro models came under sharp attack
(Lucas 1976) and some critics proceeded to challenge them with forecasts from
vector autoregressive (VAR) models (Sims 1980).11
In econometric forecasting, exogenous variables are projected outside the
model, and the model outputs of endogenous variables are as a rule subjected to
judgmental adjustments. In contrast, there are no exogenous variables in the
VAR models: each of the selected variables is predicted by regression on its
own lagged values and those of the others. In the unconstrained model, the
only use of economic theory and judgment is in choosing the variables. Since
several lags are used for each variable in each equation, the number of
variables that the model can accomodate is small. The forecasting process is
mechanical and replicable, involving no judgment on the part of the model user.
In practice, this low—cost approach frequently confronts the difficulty of
having to estimate many parameters from limited amounts of data with
measurement errors. To avoid overfitting and improve forecasts, constraints on
the coefficients are imposed in the so-called Bayesian vector autoregressions
(BVAR) with the aid of the model builder's prior distributions concerning the
stochastic properties of the processes and lags involved (Litterman 1986).
In recent years, the autoregressive integrated moving-average (ARIMA)
approach has also been used to forecast selected aggregative variables (Nelson
1972, 1984). Univariate ARIMA models require less simple statistical
techniques and computer programs than VAR, and more experienced judgment. They
of course, capture neither the signals nor the noise from the multivariate
interactions that are involved in the application of the VAR models.
Table 3 draws on recent studies (Lupoletti and Webb 1986; McNees 1986) to
compare the performance of these time-series models with several econometric
service bureaus and group forecasts from business outlook surveys. To
concentrate on the evolution over time, the reported statistics on the root
mean square errors (RMSE) are expressed at annual rates and averaged across the
forecast horizons for various periods between 1970 and 1985. In addition to12
these absolute measures of average accuracy (part A), RMSE ratios are used to
measure the accuracy of the forecasts relative to that of the corresponding VAR
and BVAR projections (part B).
Comparing the periods 1970—75, 1975-80, and 1980—83 (columns 4-6), one
finds rises in the RMSE's for the econometric bureaus' forecasts of GNP, RGNP,
and TBR (see lines 1-3, 8-10, and 22_214). But measures from another
compilation show the forecasts for GNP and RGNP having smaller average errors
in 1980-85 than in 1980-83 (Cf. columns 6 and 10). For inflation, the largest
errors are found in 1970-75 and the smallest in 1975—80, but there the
differences over time are comparatively small (lines 15—17). Forecasts made
within two quarters from business cycle turning points show relatively large
RMSE's throughout (column 9). The large average errors of 1980:14_1983:LI.
reflect mainly the unexpectedly sharp and long business contraction of 1981—82.
A simple VAR model (see Table 3, note b) performed generally worse than
the econometric services in the early and late 1970s but better in the early
1980s, for both GNP and RGMP.3 However, the VAR forecasts for inflation were
the best in 1970-75, among the best in 1980-83, and the worst in 1975—80. The
VAR predictions of interest rates compare poorly with the others in 1970—75,
favorably in 1975-80. Around the turning points, and overall, VAR did on the
whole not much worse than the econometricians, despite their much more complex
3The VAR model was estimated for the period 1952:2—1969:L, and the
obtained coefficients and predictions were then used to forecast each variable
for 1970:1—1971:2; this procedure was repeated starting with each successive
quarter to produce forecasts with horizons of 1-6 quarters for 1970:1—
1983:4. Thus the results are postsample predictions comparable in this
respect to the authentic ex-ante forecasts. However, the data used in the VAR
computations were the latest revised estimates available to the authors,
whereas the econometric services used of course the preliminary estimates
available at the time of the forecast. This could well bias the comparisons
in favor of VAR, but there is some evidence that this is not the case
(Lupoletti and Webb 1986, Table 1 and text, pp. 267—269).13
and expensive procedures (see the corresponding entries in columns 3-6 and 9,
parts A and B).
The ARIMA and BVAR models also produce mixed results but appear to be more
or less competitive with the other forecasters. Judging from the average RMSE
ratios, they outperformed VAR in four out of seven cases (columns 7 and 8).
The last column in Table 3 sums up some accuracy comparisons of BVAR with
econometric and survey forecasts, based on a study by McNees (1986). Litterman
has been making BVAR predictions monthly since 1980 (see Table 3, note b).
Real growth was predicted much better by his model than by the other
forecasters in 1980-85, while inflation was predicted much worse.
With respect to differences by forecast horizon (which are ignored in
Table 3), pairwise comparisons of the RMSE's for each VAR with each model
suggest that the relative performance of VAR improved with the length of
forecast. Cases in which VAR had smaller RMSE's than the other forecasts
account for 24%, 25%, 42%, and 142% of all comparisons for horizons of one, two,
four, and six quarters, respectively. Pairwise comparisons with BVAR show that
each of the forecasters included in Table 3 had smaller RMSE's for IPD and TRB
at all horizons. The reverse obtains for RGNP, where BVAR produced the best
results in half of the shortest and all of the longer forecasts. For GNP, BVAR
was worst in each case over horizons of 1-4 quarters but better than the others
in most of the comparisons for horizons of 6-8 quarters. When more variables
and more forecasters are included, BVAR comes out ahead in most of the
comparisons for the period 1980:2-1985:1 (see Granger's comment on McNees
1986). Fragmentary results for the more recent years, however, suggest some
deterioration. Thus Litterman's BVAR forecasts for 1984:4_1985:14 and 1985:14
1986:4 predicted high growth rates in real GNP and such of its components as
durable-goods consumption, gross private domestic investment, and residential114
construction.The corresponding realizations have been much lower in 1985 and
(so far) in 1986. Most forecasters have been much less optimistic than BVAR,
and more accurate.14
III. Conclusion, Implications and Further Thoughts
There is no evidence, here or elsewhere, that macroeconomic forecasts in
the United States have grown systematically worse, that is, less accurate, more
biased, or both. Rather this paper argues and to some extent documents that
the failures of forecasting are related to the incidence of slowdowns and
contractions in general economic activity. Not only the forecasts of real GNP
growth and unemployment but also those of nominal GNP growth and inflation tend
to go seriously wrong when such setbacks occur. This result seems strong,
though qualitatively not surprising: it confirms and extends earlier
indications of typically large turning—point errors.
The question that naturally arises at this point is, do such findings have
useful lessons for producers and users of macroeconomic forecasts? It is clear
that forecasters cannot afford to wait for long expansions to prove the
usefulness of their own activities. Instead, as our results demonstrate, there
is urgent need for the forecast makers to increase their ability to anticipate
the retardations and declines in aggregate demand, output, and employment--and
14The following tabulationcompares some of the forecasts from Litterman
1984 with the actual percentage changes for 1985 (fourth quarter over fourth
quarter):
RGNP C CD CNSGPDI NRFI RFI IPD
BVAR 3.7 14.6 10.0 3.66.2 6.1 12.33.2
Actual 2.9 3.5 6.2 3.1 0.5 6.6 7.83.3
Here the new symbols denote the percentage changes in real consumption:
total, durables, and nondurables and services (C, CD, and CNS); investment:
total (gross private domestic), nonresidential fixed and residential fixed
(GPDI, NRFI, RFI).15
for forecast users to pay particular attention to such efforts and reward any
resulting successes.
To be sure, all this is much easier said than done, but it seems highly
probable that economic forecasting can be improved to some degree and that we
are far from having reached the limits of this process. After all, macro—
forecasting as an explicit activity put to practical uses, yielding recorded
and testable results, and subject to the disciplines of market and research is
very young indeed. New and useful insights will not come easy here but will be
achieved; and new methods and new applications of old methods are being
developed continually.
The four active, broad approaches to short-term forecasting of the economy
at large are time-series models, econometric models, anticipations surveys, and
cyclical indicators. Each of these corresponds to a particular aspect of the
entire task. Thus, time—series models are best equipped to exploit intensively
the information contained in the past history of the single or several series
to be predicted; macroeconometric models, to quantify the predominant
relationships that the theory suggests exist among a larger (but not overly
large) number of variables; anticipation surveys, to estimate aggregates of
plans or intentions of economic agents for variables over which these agents
exercise considerable control; and the indicators, to signal and confirm
certain recurrent business cycle events. These are distinct but interrelated
functions. In the present practice, none of them is performed very well
because of paucity of generally agreed upon and successfully tested economic
theories that would provide strict guidance for macromodeling and because of
inadequacies of the available data, estimation, and surveying techniques. Yet
there are significant advantages to using each class of models or methods for
the task it is best suited. In short, contrary to some partisan assertions and16
criticisms, the four approaches are essentially complements, not competitors or
substitutes. They need to be refined and used in combination so as to
contribute to the improvement of the forecasts.
To illustrate, the blending of time-series analytic and traditional
econometric methods can result in better selection and projection of exogenous
variables. The devices to be used for this purpose are tests for exogeneity
and extrapolations based on full information contained in the past history of
the series to be predicted and related forward—looking data (e.g., for federal
government purchases, recent Congressional appropriations and debates).
Further, time-series models can be contstructed for, and applied to, the
residual errors from econometric equations as these terms are often far from
being purely random. The transfer functions which thus combine regression with
time—series models would be expected to have greater predictive power than
either type of model alone.5
Similarly, consistency with the lessons from anticipated surveys and
sequences of leading, coincident, and lagging indicators should enhance the
usefulness of any macroforecasting model. Probably the best way to achieve
this objective is to include the relationships involving the principal survey
data and indicators directly in the model. To mention just one important area,
promising because of strong elements of executive planning and long gestation
periods, forecasting business expenditures for new plant and equipment should
draw on surveys of backlogged and newly approved capital appropriations;
surveys of anticipated expenditures; construction contracts for plant buildings
50n time series analysis and econometric models, see Zeliner and Palm
197)4;ontransfer functions, with applications, Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981; on
exogeneity tests, Granger 1969, Sims 1972. On further developments and the
more radical and controversial "index models" (using restricted vector
autoregressions for business cycle analysis), see the collection of papers and
commentsin Sims 1977.17
and new orders of nondefense capital goods industries.
The long record of leading indicators in predicting business cycle turning
points is encouraging. With the aid of suitable time—series analytic
transformations and decision rules, it should be possible to reach considerably
better results yet in this respect. The main practical problem for this
approach lies in false signals; the errors of the other type--missed turns——are
rare and relatively unimportant. To reduce the risk of false warnings, a
system of sequential signals from both leading and confirming indicators has
been proposed and tested with generally positive results (Zarnowitz and Moore
1982 with an update in Moore 1983; Niemira 1983). Predictions with the
composite index or vector of selected leading indicators can improve on
autoregressive forecasts of changes in real GNP, industrial production, and the
rate of unemployment (Vaccara and Zarnowitz 1978; Auerbach 1982. Signals of
cyclical downturns from the leading index can take into account estimated
probability distributions of phase durations and percentage changes in the
index (Neftci 1982; Palash and Radecki 1985).
Of particular interest is a technique which combines time-series models
with Monte Carlo simulations to generate repeated sample paths of the predicted
series and probability distributions over the relevant turning points (Wecker
1979). This analysis has recently been extended to multivariate models for
related indicator series, with explicit assessments of uncertainty in the
estimates and of turning-point probabilities (Kling 1986).
To conclude, forecasters tend to rely heavily on the persistence of trends
in spending, output, and the price level. To the extent that inertia prevails
in the economy's movement, their predictions turn out to be roughly right, at
least directionally, most of the time. But the inertia, while helpful in this
sense, is only a part of the story, and such forecasts suffer from missing18
business cycle turns and underestimating recessions and recoveries with respect
to both their real and nominal effects. These errors are only in part due to
the impact of the many inevitable random disturbances to the economy that
cannot be anticipated. Although variable in their observed durations and
amplitudes, the expansions and contractions in the major economic aggregates,
both in levels and deviations from long-term trends, show many important
recurrent features. These regularities, as reflected in the relative movements
of cyclical indicators, should and can be better captured in the work of
macroeconomic forecasters.19
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in the GNP Implicit Price Index (IPD)
0.7 0.6 0.3
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1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.0
0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3
Mean Absolute Error of Forecasts (MAE)












































































1.0 1.0aBased on surveys conducted by Joseph A. Livingston, sydicated columnist. Published in
the Philadelphia Bulletin and American Banker; in recent years, in the Philadelphia
Inquirer. Of the semiannual surveys, only the end-of-year ones are used here;
questionnaire typically mailed in November, results published in December. Coverage:
1414_62 persons.
bMean of end-of-year forecasts from the following sources: (1) Fortunemagazine
("Business Roundup"); (2) Harris Bank; (3) IBM Economic Research Department; (14)
National Securities and Research Corporation; (5) NICB now Conference Board "Economic
Forum;" (6) R.W. Paterson, University of' Missouri; (7) Prudential Insurance Company of
America; (8) UCLA Business Forecasting Project. The earliest of these predictions were
made in October, the latest in January. Most of these forecasts are quarterly. For
studies of these data through 1976, see Zarnowitz, 1967, 1972, 19714, and 1979.
CGroup mean forecasts from the New York Forecasters Club. Of the semiannual forecasts,
only the end—of-year ones are included. Coverage: 31—39 individual respondents.
Dates: 1956—58, October; 1959-63, December. Collected through 1963 and analyzed in
the NBER studies referred to in note b.
dAnnual forecasts by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)as stated in the Economic
Report of the President published as a rule in January. Often midpoints in the
relatively narrow range, in a few cases interpolated and checked with the source for
approximate accuracy. See Moore, 1969, 1977, 1982; Zarnowitz, 1972, 1979; Fellner,
1976; McNees, 1977.
eSource: Quarterly releases by the American Statistical Association (ASA) and the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), published by ASA in AmStat News and by
NBER in Explorations in Economic Research and, more recently, NBER Reporter. Median
Forecasts from the November surveys only are used. Coverage varied between 25 and 814,
but mostly 30—50. See NBER studies quoted in note b; also, Zarnowitz, 1969, 19814, and
1985; Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969; Moore, 1969; Su and Su, 1975; MoNees, 1973, 19714,
1975, 1976.
'Forecasts from the Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics (RSQE) of' theUniversity
of Michigan. Published quarterly (initially, three times per year). Included here are
the forecasts released in connection with the University of Michigan annual "Conference
on the Economic Outlook," dated as a rule in November. Based on several working
models, see Suits, 1962; Hymans and Shapiro, 1970, 197k.
source: Wharton Economic Newsletter, Econometric Forecasting Unit, Wharton School of
Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania. Published quarterly; the forecasts
used here are end-of—year, as a rule dated in November. Based on a series of Wharton
models (see Evans and Klein, 1968; Evans, Klein, and Sato, 1972; McCarthy, 1972; Duggal
et al., 19714.
FlMean of the entries to the left in columns 3—9.
1Extrapolative benchmark forecasts. For GNP and RGNP (lines 1-9) assumes that next
year's percentage change will be the same as the average percentage change in the four
previous years. For IRD (lines 10-13) assumes that next year's percentage change will
be the same as that of previous year. The actual changes are based on the first
official estimates following the year for which the forecast was made. See text.Table 2
Some Sources of Variability of Errors in Composite Forecasts of Nominal
and Real Growth, Inflation, and the Unemployment Rate, 1971:2-1985:1
Period and ______________________________________________________









5 Expansions4l4) 1.10.6 -0.8
6 Contractions(12) 2.5 1.0 —2.14
C. Growth Cycle Phasesd
1.7 1.30.90.6 —0.3
2.7 2.1 2.20.8 0.3
D. Total Period Covered
9 1971:2—1985:1(56) 2.1 1.6 1.14 0.7 —0.1 0.3—0.5 —0.1















































8 Low—growth(22)aErrors are calculated from the median forecasts by the ASA-NBER survey (ANB), Chase
Econometric Associates, Inc. (CHA), Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), Wharton Econometric
Forecasting Associates, Inc. (WHM), and Bureau of Economic Analysis in the U.S.
Department of Commerce (BEA). On the sources of the forecasts, see notes to Tables 1
and 2; also, Hirsch et al., 1976 (on BEA). For the underlying data, see McNees, 1985,
Table 1, p. 37.
bSee lines 1-Li, column 2, for the dates of'theseperiods.
CExpansions, including peaks, cover quarters 1971:2-1973:4, 1975:2-1980:1, 198O:4—
1981:3, and 1983:1—1985:1. Contractions, including troughs, cover quarters 1974:1—
1975:1, 1980:2-1980:3, 1981:4_1982:14. The quarterly dates of peaks and troughs are from
the NBER business cycle chronology as used in the BEA monthly publication Business
Conditions Digest (BCD).
dHigh.growth phases are periods during which the mean growth of real GMP exceeded the
long—term trend rate (about 3% per year): 1971:2-1972:4, 1975:2—1978:4, 1980:4—1981:1,
and 1983:1—1985:1. Low—growth phases are periods of below—trend growth in real GNP:
1973:2—1975:1, 1979:1—1980:3,'and 1981:2—1982:4.Table 3
Average Accuracy of Econometric and Other Forecasting Services
vs. Extrapolations from Time—Series Models, 1970-85 and Subperiods
A. Measures of Absolute Accuracy
Root Mean Square Errors (RMSE)a ______
1970:4 1970:4 1975:2 1980:14 1976:2 1980:3Around 1980:2
to to to to to to Turning to
Line Forecasterb 1983:kc 1975:1 1980:3 1983:14l982:14el983:14' Points 1985:111
(1) (2) (3) (14) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Growth Rate of Gross National Product (GNP)
1 Chase 4.0 2.3 4.0 5.14 43
2 DRI 3.5 2.3 3.0 5.0 3.9
3 Wharton 3.6 2.7 3.0 4.9 14.2
4 ANB 3.8
5 VAR 14.3 4.9 3.8 14.3 4.6 4.5 14.1
6 ARIMA 14.8
7 BVPIR 5.0 4.3
Growth Rate of Real GNP (RGNP)
8 Chase 3.0 2.4 2.8 3.8 3.14 3.0
9 DRI 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.6 3.6 2.8
10 Wharton 2.8 2.7 2.5 3.2 I 3.3 2.7
11 ANB 3.0
12 VAR 3.6 14.3 3.2 3.14 3.5 3.5 3,9
13 ARIMA 3.4
14 BVAR 2.6 2.3
Rate of Inflation in the GNP Implicit Price Deflator (IPD)
15 Chase 2.6 2.6 1.7 2.0 2.3 1.9
16 DRI 2.1 2.8 1.6 1.8 2.3 1.8
17 Wharton 2.0 2.4 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0
18 ANB 1.14
19 VAR 2.2 2.0 2.3 1.8 2.0 2.14 2.5
20 ARIMA 1.8
21 BVAR 3.5 3.3
90-Day Treasury Bill Rate (TRB)
22 Chase 2.5 1.6 2.4 3.3 2.7 2.6
23 DRI 2.3 1.5 1.9 3.14 2.6 3.0
214 Wharton n.a. n.a. 2.2 3.0 n.a. 3.0
25 VAR 2.14 2.1 1.8 3.6 3.6 2.8




































































B. Measures of Relative Accuracy





































































forecast horizons as follows: columns 3-6, 8, and 9, means of RMSE
2, 14, and 6 quarters; column 7, means for horizons of 1, 2, and 14
quarters;
column 10, means for horizons of 1-8 quarters.
VAR unrestricted vector autoregressive model with six lags for each of five
variables (percentage changes in the monetary base, real GNP, and IPD; the
manufacturing capacity utilization rate; and the 90-day Treasury bill rate; see Webb
19814 and Lupoletti and Webb 1986). ARIMAunivariate autoregressive integrated moving
average model (Nelson 1972, 19814). BVARBayesian vector autoregressive model with
six lags for each of seven variables (annual growth rates of real GNP and IPD; the
unemployment rate; lagged levels of the money supply Ml and of gross private domestic
investment; l—6 month commercial paper rate; and the change in business inventories;
see Litterman 1986). The BVAR model used in 1980-83 (column 7) consists of six
variables (it does not contain the inventory series and uses real business fixedinvestment instead of GPDI). On the sources of the other forecasts, see references in
notes to Tables 1and2. All underlying data are authentic (postsample) forecasts
measured at annual rates.
CThe dates are for 1-quarter forecasts; 2—quarter forecasts: 1971:1—1983:4; 14—quarter
forecasts: 1971:3—1983:4; 6-quarter forecasts: 1972:1_1983:14.
dThe dates are for 1-quarter forecasts; see note c on the starting dates for 2—, )4_,
and 6—quarter forecasts.
eThe dates are for 1-quarter forecasts: 2-quarter forecasts: 1976:3—1982:4; 4—quarter
forecasts: 1977:1—1982:4.
The dates are for 1-quarter forecasts; 2-quarter forecasts: 1980:141983:14; 4—quarter
forecasts: 1981:2—1983:4; 6—quarter forecasts: 1981:4—1983:4.
forecasts made within two quarters from a business cycle turning point (!'JBER
dates). For periods covered, see note c.
hDates show the forecast period covered. The RMSEentriesare in percentage points,
cumulative growth at annual rates (GNP, RGNP, IPD) and in percentage points, cumulative
changes (TRB). Chase, DRI and Wharton are "early—quarter" forecasts, ANB are "mid—
quarter" forecasts. BVAR are based on data available early in each quarter. The BVAR
predictions based on data as of mid-quarter and comparable to ANB are: GNP, 4.1; RGNP,
?.4;IPD, 2.8.
1Basedon entries in part A, columns 3-9.Ratios of RMSE of other forecasts to the
qorresponding RMSE of VAR.
JBasedon entries in part A, column10.Ratios of RMSEof other forecasts to the
correspondingRMSE of BVAR. The BVAR figures used in the ratios for Chase, DRI, and
Wharton are those in lines 7, 14, 21, and 26. For the BVAR figures used in the ratios
for PLNB, see note h.
Sources:Columns 3-9: Lupolettiand Webb 1986, Tables 2-8. Column 10: MeNees 1986,
Tables1, 2, 5, and 6.